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vABSTRACT
Leakage of confidential information from an organization's networks has become a 
big threat to its information security. Egress monitoring and filtering have thus become 
popular for detecting such security breaches. Egress monitoring tools scan outgoing packets 
for keywords or their combinations present in the confidential documents. These content 
filtering techniques however fail when the data is encrypted.   
The solution proposed in this thesis is simple yet an effective approach to prevent 
information leakage when the data is encrypted. We assume that a policy is in place which 
disallows encrypted content from specific hosts, ports and applications and wish to detect any 
violations to this policy. This work aims at analyzing encrypted and unencrypted traffic flows 
across a gateway and detecting unauthorized encrypted traffic flows.  The work discusses a 
low level approach to detect encryption, based on entropy calculation and packet analysis. 
The technique is based on the fact that encrypted data consists of a random distribution of
symbols whose entropy is expected to be quite high as compared to an unencrypted file. 
Techniques to differentiate between encrypted and high entropy compressed traffic are also 
discussed. This thesis implements and compares statistical methods for a fast online detection 
of encrypted traffic from all the other unencrypted traffic flowing across a network.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
A company's employees are a major threat to a company's confidential data which 
may consists of design documents, financial information, code for a new software etc. A 
survey conducted in 2006 by Computer Security Institute/ FBI computer Crime and Security 
puts leakage of private information and internal security as the two biggest concerns of 
companies [1].
Most egress filtering techniques aim to filter out IP addresses and ports or are content 
based, i.e. they parse the text in the packets leaving an organization's network and block them 
if they violate a rule. These techniques fail when the data leaving the network is encrypted. In 
this dissertation this problem is addressed, by developing methods which carry out a series of 
statistical tests on the outgoing data to detect encrypted traffic. We also differentiate 
encrypted traffic streams from compressed traffic streams which appears quite random. The 
suspected encrypted traffic streams could then either be quarantined or completely blocked 
from leaving the company’s gateway by dropping them and logging an alert.
The proposed approach offers a unique solution which does not depend on specific 
applications or contents of various files. Encrypted stream is detected by calculating the
entropy and randomness of the outgoing stream, and determining the variation from the 
expected values. The entropy or randomness of an encrypted stream is quite high and we 
make use of the low entropy present in an unencrypted stream by a series of statistical tests, 
which can be implemented online on a company's networks. The proposed technique
achieves a low false positive rate and a negligible false negative rate when detecting 
encryption.
2                                                           Figure 1: Threat Model
1.1   The Threat Model
The assumptions we make in this work is based on a threat model which is both 
simple and realistic. The threat model we consider consists of an experienced user familiar 
with the concepts of encryption and having the knowledge of content parsing egress filters 
which may or may not be configured on an organization's gateway. He is capable of 
employing any or all of the below methods to evade detection of leakage of confidential 
information. Some of the methods are:
1) The malicious employee removes the file headers of files such as PDF, JPEG etc to render 
the content scanning egress tools useless which parse outgoing files for file extensions.
2) The malicious employee tries to encrypt the document using a good encryption scheme
such as AES, so as to evade the egress filters.
3) The malicious employee may encrypt and/or remove the headers of the encrypted file to 
3evade detection.
1.2 Thesis Structure
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. The thesis first discusses ‘related work’
in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes general concepts of entropy and randomness in compresses 
and encrypted file streams. Chapter 4 provides an overview of various statistical tests that 
were implemented. The basic flow diagram underlining our approach to differentiate 
encrypted and unencrypted streams is discussed in Chapter 5. This chapter also discusses the 
experimental design and the implemented tests and the experimental results we obtained to 
support our approach. Chapter 6 discusses future work and possible extension of this research 
and we draw conclusions in Chapter 7.
4CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
Egress filtering techniques have been around for quite some time and they deal with 
filtering outbound spam, malicious traffic and confidential information. Filtering outbound 
traffic is often a common solution to mitigate Denial of Service (DOS) attacks [2]. Almost all 
of the present techniques try to filter traffic by matching signatures already present in the 
database.  
According to [3], almost all corporate information is present in an electronic form, 
and is easily accessible by any employee. Thus there is a high risk involved if the sensitive 
data leaks from the company due to an employee mistake or incase of a deliberate disclosure. 
The solution proposed, creates a fingerprint of sensitive documents by taking in to account 
words, sentences or data fields in a document and analyzing the data fields using a 
combination of rules and categories for an exact or a partial matching. The technique 
however requires maintaining a large fingerprint database which can become extremely 
difficult to manage for large organizations. It also doesn’t offer a real time solution as content 
parsing and pattern matching is time consuming.
The paper by R. Clayton [2], deals with extrusion detection and monitoring the 
outbound emails from a company’s networks. The paper deals with automatic processing of 
email logs at a server of an ISP that is used to send emails through SMTP. Their technique 
tries to detect bulk emails which are returned since they were sent to invalid or invented 
addresses. The mechanism uses protocol details such as the ‘HELO’ command and the ‘Mail 
From’ fields to identify the sending host and the email id of the sender. It also considers the 
IP addresses of the sender in the header. Some of the heuristics deal with spotting malformed 
5‘HELO’ strings and detecting email loops. A related concept of outbound filtering is 
discussed in this work, whereas our aim is to detect outbound encrypted emails containing 
confidential information. This is achieved by calculating statistics of an outbound packet 
instead of parsing it and filtering it for sensitive data. The technique can also be used in 
extrusion detection in a possible scenario where a trojan/backdoor installed by a malicious 
outsider or a competitor on a rival’s machine/s tries to encrypt confidential data and send 
back the information to itself. Such encrypted content would be blocked before it can leave 
the company’s gateways.
A lot of work has been done in traffic analysis and analyzing anonymity systems [4, 
5, 6].  Liberatore, et al. [4] looks at encrypted SSH tunnels and anonymous communication 
systems which aim to hide the true destination and source of HTTP requests. Their technique 
involves analyzing encrypted traffic by comparing it with traffic whose profiles are known in 
advance. Sun, et al. [5] discuss a similar approach for statistical identification of encrypted 
web browsing traffic where instead of just looking at the packet lengths they consider HTTP 
object counts and sizes. A signature of encrypted web pages is maintained consisting of the 
number of objects requested by a web browser in downloading a web page and the object 
lengths. Both the techniques use classification algorithms such as Bayesian classification 
algorithm, for matching and identifying the test corpus libraries of known encrypted traffic. 
The above techniques do well in inferring encrypted web traffic since they have nearly static 
sizes, but it is infeasible to use them to determine encrypted files which may be in different 
formats or of different sizes and could be encrypted using any key. Since files can be 
encrypted using any key, maintaining a profile of all the encrypted confidential files is nearly 
impossible. The technique involves the comparison of packet lengths, which can be altered 
6by padding, thus rendering the identification difficult. Dang, et al. [6] analyze network traffic 
for detecting self-decrypting exploit code. They propose a hybrid approach that consists of 
static analysis and emulated instruction execution techniques to detect the decryption routine 
typical to most encrypted exploit code. The proposed method tries to locate the position 
where the decryption routine starts from. They then use backward data flow analysis to find 
the decryption instructions and then attempts to identify the self modifying decryption 
routines by an emulated execution of already recovered decryption instructions. Our aim 
however is to statistically determine the existence of encrypted traffic when no decryption 
routine is present.
A white paper by McAfee [7] describes one of their Network IPS, which detects SSL 
encrypted attacks. The IPS tries to mitigate such attacks by inspecting the encrypted traffic 
by storing the private key of the SSL server on sensors deployed in the network. The sensors 
decrypt the flowing traffic using the session keys derived from the private key. Once 
decrypted the packet is processed and forwarded to signature matching engines, to detect a 
possible attack.
Encrypted data is more uniformly distributed than unencrypted data, and this is used 
to locate cryptographic keys hidden in large amounts of data [8] such as on a hard disk or 
tape. Shamir et al. [8] discusses algebraic attacks in locating secret RSA keys in long streams 
of data, and uses statistical methods to identify cryptography keys embedded in large data 
streams. They propose a method to divide the entire dataset in to small blocks and measuring 
the entropy of each block by counting the unique byte values of data in order to determine 
high entropy regions which would indicate locations where a cryptographic key may be 
present. This method of  frequency calculation to determine entropy works well when the 
7surrounding data has low entropy such as in ‘text’ but fails when the encrypted data is 
interspersed with other high entropy data such as compressed text, or file formats such as
PDF, and JPEG. More specific statistical tests are thus required to distinguish the high 
entropy data from encrypted data.
8CHAPTER 3.  CONCEPTS OF COMPRESSION AND ENCRYPTION
This chapter gives a brief overview of egress filtering; it’s importance and describes 
the concepts of randomness and entropy in relation with compression and encryption 
algorithms. It also gives an insight on how a compressed and encrypted data stream is 
supposed to look like when viewed as a stream of bytes.
3.1 Egress Filtering
Egress filtering means filtering outbound traffic as it leaves a computer or a network 
for a destination address that is outside a company's networks. Screening egress traffic is 
essential as it could contain confidential information, malicious traffic trying to attack 
computers on the outside or even traffic from a bot spamming the internet. It may even be a 
malicious user or a company's employee trying to send some confidential information to the 
company's rivals either through emails or by file sharing using P2P applications or through 
instant messengers. The above mentioned scenarios are a big cause of concern for
organizations and leads to losses and embarrassment when confidential data gets leaked. The 
outbound data should therefore be given the same importance as the inbound data and should 
be closely monitored for any classified information and malicious activity. This work 
discusses differentiating encrypted outbound traffic stream from all the other traffic streams
which may contain confidential information of an organization such as financial documents, 
software designs, code etc.
93.2    Entropy and Randomness
A related concept to randomness in an information/data stream is the concept of 
entropy or uncertainty in that stream.  According to Information Theory [9], entropy is 
described as the measurement of the unpredictability of data in the information source, in 
other words it means the measurement of randomness in data. The entropy of the data 
increases with greater randomness in the data in the information source.  It can also be 
interpreted as the shortest message in bits that needs to be transmitted in order to express the 
correct meaning of the message. A compressed message therefore has a high degree of 
entropy and appears random.
Shannon [9] gives the following equation to calculate the entropy of an information 
source involving the discrete variable 'X' as:
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x: A random variable
p(x): The probability density function of x.
The maximum entropy from the above equation can only be obtained when the 
probability of occurrence of each event is equally likely. This means that if any one of the 
event is more likely to occur than the other, the overall entropy of the system decreases. Thus 
for a system to have a high entropy, the occurrence of each of its events should be as random 
as possible, in other words the occurrence of an event should be unpredictable.    
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3.3    Encryption and randomness
Randomness plays an important role in cryptography. Encrypted data should appear 
to be a random string of characters such that no meaningful information can be inferred by 
looking at the data or by carrying out any statistical tests on it.  This means that the encrypted 
data should not show any resemblance to the plain text. An ideal encryption algorithm thus 
would create an encrypted stream which would appear as a random noise to the observer. 
This unpredictability of an encrypted stream of data is desirable as it is difficult to establish a 
predictable pattern in the stream. The characters in the encrypted stream should therefore be 
independent of any of the previous characters present in the stream.  Therefore if there are 
two random variables X and Y then the condition that X does not reveal any information 
about Y is only possible when X and Y are statistically independent. In other words [9], the 
mutual information I(X, Y) which can be defined as the dependence of one variable on the 
other should be much low. Therefore as discussed above an ideal encrypted stream should 
have an equal probability distribution of the characters present in the stream.  The entropy of
encrypted data is considered to be high as there is a lot of uncertainty present in the 
information stream as to what the original message is. In other words the encrypted message 
has higher entropy than the original message.
3.4   Compression Algorithms and Randomness
Most of the present compression formats such as zip, gzip, bzip and rar make use of 
compression algorithms such as LZ77 [12] , Deflate, and encoding techniques which include 
run-length coding and Huffman coding [12]. The basic aim of any compression algorithm is 
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to reduce the size of the data by decreasing the redundancy present in the data. The 
compressed data is thus devoid of any duplicate patterns present in the original data. A 
compressed data can be considered a fairly random stream of bytes. According to the 
Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity [10-11] a string is considered to be random if there exists 
no other shorter description of the string. Since each byte in the compressed data contains 
more information than the original uncompressed data, the entropy of this compressed data is 
greater than its uncompressed version. Despite the low redundancy and high entropy of a 
compressed stream, there exists a small difference in the entropy levels of an encrypted 
stream and a compressed stream. Compression algorithms such as Gzip [12] work by 
replacing the repeated sequences of characters in the data by a pointer to the previous 
repeated sequence in the form of a distance pair and a length field which gives the length of 
the repeated sequence. The maximum distance can be up to 32K bytes and the length up to 
258 bytes.  The match lengths and match distances are further compressed using Huffman 
trees [12], which are stored in the compressed form at the start of each block. Other 
algorithms such as Bzip [13] use a variant of run-length encoding for compression by 
replacing the repeated sequences by a single repeated character and a count. The
implementation of the compression algorithms gives an idea that the compressed stream 
shares certain characteristics with the original uncompressed stream. Therefore a compressed 
stream cannot be considered a truly random stream even though the difference between their 
entropy and the encrypted stream is not significant. The resemblance that a compressed data 
shows to its uncompressed version can be used to differentiate between the compressed and 
encrypted data.
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CHAPTER 4.  OVERVIEW OF STATISTICAL TESTS
This chapter describes some of the statistical tests used to calculate randomness and 
measure entropy in data streams. All of these tests have been used in the course of this
research and at times two or more of these tests have been used together to draw conclusions.
Some of the tests described below were instrumental in this research in differentiating 
encrypted streams from the other unencrypted streams. The rest of the tests although did not 
give the desired results, they gave a direction to keep trying different tests to eventually 
achieve the research goals. A brief overview of some of the statistical tests which were used 
to check randomness and calculate entropy in streams is as follows:
4.1  Discrete Runs Test
This test is a type of an empirical test which helps determine whether a given 
sequence of numbers has statistical properties similar to a sequence whose elements have a 
uniform probability distribution [14]. In the test consecutive elements in the stream of data 
are parsed till they are monotonically increasing. The length of this run is calculated once the 
sequence stops increasing.
The input to the test [14] is a stream of integers X = X1, X2, X3..., where Xi????
d for 
all Xi. The stream of integers is supposed to contain at least one pair (Xi, Xi+1) so that Xi+1 < 
Xi. The run length Lx of X is a positive integer n such that 
X1 <= X2 <= X3.....< Xn > Xn+1
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When more than one run is to be calculated the next sequence starts from Xn+2 to 
ensure that the calculations are independent of each other. These observed run lengths are 
compared with the expected run length probabilities for a stream of uniform distributed data 
given by the ‘runs test probabilities table’ [14]. A Chi Square test can then be used to 
calculate the deviation of the observed runs from the expected runs. A high deviation of the 
observed runs from the expected runs would mean a non uniform distribution in the given 
sequence of data and hence non randomness.
4.2 Phase Space Analysis
This technique differs from the above techniques in testing a data stream for 
randomness as this test deals with looking at the data stream in a 'n' dimensional space. As 
described by [15], phase space can be defined as a 'n' dimensional space that can be used to 
depict the state of an ‘n’ variable system.  The shape thus generated by plotting the data in a 
phase space shows dependencies between successive elements in the sequence of data. 
A three dimensional plot of a one dimensional input can be generated by a technique 
known as delayed coordinates [15]. For a stream of data with the content 'C' present in the 
stream, the points (x, y, z) in the phase space can be calculated using the following equations:
                                     X[i] = C[n-2] – C[n-3]                   (3)
             Y[i] = C[n-1] – C[n-2]                   (4)
 Z[i] = C[n] – C[n-1]                   (5)
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A three dimensional phase plot of a high entropy random data would reveal no 
structures or patterns. It would appear as a uniform distribution of points in the phase space 
forming no distinguishable patterns. A low entropy data stream on the other hand would 
show a distinctive correlation pattern since the successive values in the data are not 
independent of each other.
4.3 Auto Correlation Test
This is the cross correlation test of the data stream with itself which can be used to 
reveal a cyclic pattern in the stream. This test can be used to detect the periodic nature of the 
examined data. The randomness of the data is checked by calculating autocorrelation for the 
values of the data stream at different time lags [16]. The autocorrelations should be much 
close to zero if the data stream is truly random, otherwise one or more correlations would 
show high variations from 0. The autocorrelation is calculated as follows [16]:
Rh = Ch / Co (6)
Ch: Auto covariance function
Co: Variance function
Rh: lies between -1 and +1
Ch can be calculated by the below equation:
∑
−
=
+ −−=
hN
t
htth YYYYN
C
1
))((
1
(7)
15
N: Total length of the data stream
h: Correlation lag
Y : Mean of N values
and Co is the variance function calculated by the equation:
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4.4 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-test)
 This test is an alternative to the chi-squared goodness of fit test [17]. Similar to chi-
square, it can be used to test the hypothesis that a given sample follows a hypothesized 
distribution. It is more sensitive to small variations between the observed and the 
hypothesized distributions. The test is computed as follows [17]:
a) S(x), the empirical cumulative distribution function is computed from a  
                            sample of N observations.
b) G(x), the theoretical cumulative distribution function is computed by  
considering that the null hypothesis is true.
c) C=maxi |G (xi) – S (xi)| is calculated for each of the N sample points.
d) ?? ??????????? ?????? ???? ??? ???????? ???? ???? ??????????? ??? ????????? ??? ????
tabulated critical value at that level of significance is greater than the value 
of C.
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4.5 Arithmetic Mean
This test calculates the average mean of the data present in the traffic stream. The 
traffic stream is made up of symbols whose values range from 0 to 255. The arithmetic mean 
of a stream is calculated as:
A= (C1+C2+C3+........+Cn)/n  (9)
C: ASCII value of the characters in the stream.
N: Total no. of characters in the stream.
Arithmetic mean of an encrypted stream should be much close to the value ‘127.5’
since it’s the average value and there's an equal probability of the occurrence of each 
character in the stream. On the other hand for an unencrypted stream, the arithmetic mean 
should show a large deviation from the value ‘127.5’. This test can be implemented online 
easily without many resources and can quickly screen the low entropy data streams from the 
high entropy streams.
4.6 Information Entropy
Information entropy is the measure of the density [9] of the information present in a 
data stream. In other words it’s an indicator of the amount of information present in the 
stream. A high amount of information present indicates that the stream cannot be compressed 
too much without loosing any information present. Entropy is also the amount of uncertainty
present in a stream; a completely random stream would thus have high entropy. Shannon [9] 
gives the equation for calculating the entropy of the data present in a file/stream as:
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X: Discrete random variable 
p(x): Probability density function of X. 
For a stream with a highly random distribution of characters the entropy should be 
close to 8bits per symbol. This means that even if the previous symbols are known, it’s still
impossible to predict the next symbol in the stream. This means that the stream has a high 
information density and is essentially random.
4.7 Chi-Square Test
This is one of the commonly used tests to check for randomness in a stream of data. 
This test calculates the degree to which 2 given samples of data differ from each other. In 
other words it is used to test whether a set of data follows a specific distribution. The Chi-
Square test tells the degree of confidence one can have in rejecting or accepting a hypothesis.
The following hypothesis is considered in this work:
P1= The data stream follows a particular distribution/The data stream is highly      
random.
P2= The data stream does not follow a particular distribution/The data stream is    
not random. 
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The entire data stream is divided among k bins and the chi-square is calculated using the 
equation:
∑
=
−=
k
i
iii EEO
1
22 /)(X (12)
k: No. of bins
Oi: Observed frequency for the i
th bin.
Ei:  Expected frequency for the i
th bin.
The chi square values are expressed as an [18] absolute number and a percentage 
which gives a measure of the frequency with which a truly random sequence exceeds this 
value by chance. As defined by [18] if the percentage 'p' is:
a) 1%>p or p>99% the stream is not random and the hypothesis P1 is rejected.
b) 1%< p <5% or  95%<p<99%, the sequence is “suspect” [18]. 
c)  90%< p <95% and 5%< p <10%, the sequence is “almost suspect” [18].
4.8 Index of Coincidence Test
The index of coincidence for a text [19] is the measure of the probability that two 
letters selected from the text are identical. Thus it's a statistical measure of the redundancy in 
a text. For a truly random, high entropy stream the index of coincidence is much close to 1. If 
the value shows a large deviation from 1, it indicates that the stream is highly structured and 
has low entropy. The Index of Coincidence can be calculated [19] as:
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N: The length of the text,
ni: The frequency of the character i in the text,
C: The number of letters in the alphabet.
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CHAPTER 5. IMPLEMENTATION
This chapter first gives an overview of the basic approach taken to differentiate 
encrypted data streams from unencrypted streams. It then discusses the various statistical 
tests which were tried in order to obtain satisfactory results. Some of the tests did not 
perform as well as others but they gave us confidence that a similar approach would work if 
it was tweaked or more refined. A series of tests were performed on the test corpus consisting 
of varying file formats and lengths. The tests were evaluated and compared on the amount of 
data they required, the false positive and negative rates obtained and the ease with which they 
could be implemented. Finally we recommend some tests which gave suitable results and 
tried to minimize the false positive and false negative rates to make them feasible for use on 
a network as an online filter.
5.1 The basic flow diagram
The figure (2) below is a flow diagram which gives the fundamental steps of 
distinguishing encrypted data streams from other non encrypted streams. This process of 
differentiating encrypted streams can be broken down in to 4 steps as described below.
5.1.1 Checking for encryption ports and addresses
The outgoing data stream is intercepted by the filtering tool at a company’s gateway 
and the source IP addresses and ports are checked. If the IP address and port matches the list 
of ports and addresses on which encryption is not allowed, the data stream is subjected to 
filtering tests, as described in the next steps. 
21
Figure 2: Basic Flow Diagram
5.1.2 Checking for low entropy streams
If the data stream is to be checked for encrypted traffic as determined above, the 
entropy of the incoming data stream is calculated. The entropy gives a measure of 
randomness present in the data stream. The first step therefore is to check for low entropy in 
the outgoing data stream. In this step we check whether the outgoing stream is a plain text or 
some data having high redundancy and less randomness. If the entropy of the stream is above 
a specified threshold, the stream has a high chance that it’s encrypted and is subjected to 
further tests. The uncertainty in determining encryption is because the data stream may be 
compressed or it may be a high entropy file format which would also result in characteristics 
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similar to an encrypted stream; therefore other tests are required to detect encryption with a 
high precision. If however the entropy of the stream is less than the threshold, the stream is 
considered to be unencrypted and is forwarded to the content filters to check for confidential 
information.
5.1.3 Checking for high entropy streams 
If the data stream cannot be categorized as a low entropy stream above, then in order 
to categorize it as encrypted we need to make sure that the stream is not one of the other
highly random data streams such as PDF, Jpeg etc or a compressed stream. In order to 
differentiate encrypted streams from other high entropy streams, further statistical tests are 
carried out. This differentiation however is not easy as most of the modern compression 
algorithms are capable of compressing data very well. The compressed stream therefore has
less redundancy and some tests fail to differentiate encrypted streams from compressed 
streams. However as some of our initial results showed, a compressed stream does have 
certain characteristics which can be used to make the differentiation from highly random 
encrypted data. Some of the tests that were carried out proved to be quite useful and gave 
results which showed that an encrypted stream can be differentiated from high entropy 
streams without a high false positive and false negative rate. Later in the chapter we go in to 
the details of these tests, the observations made and the results obtained.
5.1.4 Blocking or Passing the stream
If the data stream shows a high deviation from the expected as determined in the 
previous step, then the null hypothesis that the stream is encrypted is rejected and the stream 
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is forwarded for content processing to determine if it contains any sensitive information. 
Otherwise if the stream shows quite small deviation from the expected, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected and the data stream is then either blocked from leaving the gateway, sent 
for quarantine or is forwarded for content processing and an alert is logged. Figure 3 below 
shows a high level security model to counter the threat model shown in chapter 1. The model 
now has a statistical analysis server which intercepts all traffic going out of the company’s 
networks. Statistical tests are carried out on the outbound traffic stream and if it matches the 
encrypted profile, they are blocked from leaving the networks and the incident is logged and 
an alert generated.
5.2 Test Corpus
The test corpus considered for testing; consisted of files in various formats such as 
DOC, JPEG, TXT, and PDF. Most of the sensitive/confidential documents exist in one of 
these formats; hence the four file types were used in the tests. As many as 100 files of 
various sizes ranging from 5KB to 5 MB were considered for carrying out the tests. The size 
range considered would encompass most of the company documents. Differentiating 
encrypted data from unencrypted is easier for big file sizes and a 5MB upper limit is 
sufficient to differentiate encryption from all the other data with low false positive and 
negative rates. The files were compressed using Gzip, Zip, Rar, and Bzip compression 
formats, which are some of the common compression formats being used on Windows and 
Linux based systems. The algorithm used to encrypt files was AES-256 bits, in Cipher Block 
Chaining mode which has been adopted as the encryption standard by the US government
and is one of the default options for many encryption tools. We obtained similar results for 
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files encrypted by DES in Cipher Block Chaining mode.
Figure 3: The Security Model
5.3 Assumptions
The initial step is to determine whether the outgoing traffic stream needs to be filtered 
for encrypted confidential content. As mentioned before in this chapter, an assumption is 
made that the organization has a rule or a policy in place to disallow encrypted content from 
specific ports or IP addresses. The outgoing packets are checked whether their source IP 
addresses or ports are those which need to be filtered for encrypted content. If the packet 
needs to be filtered, its data payload needs to be extracted from the Ethernet packet. An 
Ethernet frame consists of an Ethernet header followed by an IP header and a TCP header 
and finally the TCP data which is being transmitted. The data payload starts approximately 
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after the initial 54bytes of the Ethernet frame, thus the initial headers are stripped off to 
obtain the data payload. Once the payload is extracted, it is stored in a buffer until we 
achieve minimum number of bytes required for the tests. The buffer sizes range from 1KB to 
8 KB and since the maximum size of a data payload is around 1500bytes around six to seven
packets are required at a minimum to make up a buffer. The outgoing packets can be stored 
in an array of buffers to be used for real time statistical tests. The next major steps required to 
differentiate between the encrypted and unencrypted traffic stream is to first filter out the low 
entropy stream such as payload in the form of Doc, Txt and other text format which have a 
relatively low entropy as compared to the encrypted traffic stream. If the traffic fails to be 
categorized as a low entropy stream, it needs to be checked for high entropy content such as 
compressed streams having high randomness comparable to that of encrypted streams.
5.4 The Initial Tests and Observations
 Figure 2 shows the basic approach taken to differentiate between encrypted and other 
traffic leaving a company’s networks. This section describes some of the initial tests that 
were carried out to implement the steps described above.      
5.4.1 The Frequency Analysis
Frequency analysis of a data stream shows the distribution of symbols in the stream.  
Figures 4 - 6 below shows the frequency distribution of three data streams, a DOC file, the 
same file encrypted and compressed. The encrypted stream shows a much uniform
distribution of symbols, looking at Figure 6 the encrypted stream looks like a uniform noise 
having no distinguishing pattern. Figure 4 on the other hand shows a frequency distribution 
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of a DOC file. The figure clearly shows that the distribution is not uniform and this is not 
surprising as the distribution depicts low entropy and non random distribution characteristics 
of the English language. Some of the characters in the English language are more common 
than others and hence the irregular distribution. Figure 5 is a frequency distribution of a 
compressed DOC.
Figure 4: Frequency Distribution of Doc Stream.
                            Figure 5: Frequency Distribution of Compressed Doc Stream.  
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Figure 6: Frequency Distribution of Encrypted Doc Stream.
The frequency distribution of a compressed file appears to be fairly uniform but on 
looking at it more closely a striking characteristic can be noticed. The figure shows that the 
frequency distribution at values of powers of ‘2’ is much low. The drop in the frequency 
becomes quite apparent at higher powers of ‘2’ and as the file size increases. The compressed 
stream even though has low redundancy and therefore high entropy, it still has some low 
entropy content which could be due to the implementation of the compression algorithm. 
According to [9] a perfect compression is quite difficult to achieve and one can expect some 
redundancy present in a compressed data stream. This non random behavior can be used in 
differentiating high entropy content from encrypted content.
5.4.2 Phase Space Analysis
This test [15] as described in the previous chapter deals with looking at a data stream 
in a 'n' dimensional space. This technique [15] of plotting the data in a phase space shows 
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dependencies between successive elements in the data stream. This test was used to plot the 
data stream in a 3 dimensional space using the technique known as delayed coordinates. 
The equations (3) (4) & (5) given in the previous chapter were used to plot the 
content 'C' present in the data stream. Three types of data streams of varying entropy such as 
low entropy plain text streams, high entropy compressed streams and encrypted streams were 
plotted in order to get an idea of the dependency that was present in the three streams. The 
Figures 7, 8, 9 below, shows a 3 dimensional plot of a plain, compressed and an encrypted 
stream respectively. As can be seen by looking at the three figures, the phase space plot of 
the plain text stream is highly structured. In other words there are areas in the plot where the 
data content is denser than the rest of the areas. Such distribution in the plot shows that 
dependencies exist between successive elements in the data stream. Figures 8 and 9 on the 
other hand show a uniform distribution of the content in the data stream. This tells us that the 
data stream has quite few dependencies and therefore has high entropy. The results show that 
both encrypted and compressed streams have much less redundancy and therefore uniform 
distribution. Phase space analysis therefore did not prove to be a good differentiating test for 
encrypted and other high entropy streams; it gave us a good idea about the dependencies
present in different types of data streams.
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         Figure 7: PSA plot of a Doc File
Figure 8: PSA plot of a Compressed Doc File
Figure 9: PSA plot of an Encrypted Doc File
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5.4.3 KS Test
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test as described in the previous chapter is a test which can 
be used as an alternative to the chi-square test. This test was used to check whether a given 
data stream follows the hypothesized distribution which is highly random as in an encrypted 
stream. The test was carried out on the three types of data streams ie. low entropy, high 
entropy compressed and encrypted. The implementation considers 8 bins having 32 values 
each which means the range from 0-1 is divided in to 8 intervals. The theoretical cumulative 
distribution is calculated as (1/256)*32*Nth interval where N ranges from one to eight. This is 
because the expected distribution is the distribution of the encrypted data stream which is 
considered to be highly random and thus each of the symbols has an equal probability of 
occurrence. 
The three tables below show the results of applying the KS test on the three data 
streams. Table (a) gives the observations of the low entropy data. There is a large deviation 
between the empirical cumulative distribution S(x) and the theoretical cumulative 
distribution G(x). This shows that for a low entropy stream this test does well in 
differentiating from the hypothesized distribution. On the other hand table (b) shows a 
compressed stream close to the hypothesized distribution and thus this test fails in 
differentiating high entropy streams from encrypted streams. The below tables give values 
for 3 file streams having different entropy. The entire file stream was considered as a one 
continuous data stream and the KS test was applied on it. The packets flowing across a 
network have a maximum size of 1500 bytes, which is much smaller in size than the file 
streams considered above. 
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Table (a) Table (b)       Table (c)
To simulate the real scenario approximately 60 files from each of the file streams 
considered above were taken as blocks of 1024 bytes and were then subjected to the KS test. 
As described in the previous chapter, difference C=maxi | G(xi) – S(xi)| was calculated for 
each of the block in each file stream.
The value ‘C’ computed is the maximum absolute difference between the cumulative 
observed distribution and the cumulative expected distribution when considering the 
hypothesized distribution. This value ‘C’ can then be compared to a critical value in the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution table for a sample size equal to 256. The critical value as 
given by the table can be calculated as 1.22/SQRT(N) at .10 confidence level where N is the 
sample size which is equal to 256 in this case. If the computed value ‘C’ is less than the 
critical value obtained from the table, the null hypothesis is rejected. In this case the critical 
value at .10 confidence level came out to be ‘0.0762’.
The average of the values of ‘C’ was calculated for all the blocks across all the 60 
files considered in each stream and the results are summarized in the table (d) below:
Streams Low Entropy High Entropy Encrypted
µ(C) 0.2026 0.0305 0.0226
Table (d)
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The mean of value ‘C’ for low entropy streams is more than the critical value 
calculated from the KS tables and therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected. The value ‘C’ 
for high entropy streams is less than the critical value and thus the hypothesis that the 
distribution is truly random cannot be rejected for high entropy streams. This test therefore
also cannot be used to differentiate between encrypted and other high entropy streams even 
though it does well in differentiating low entropy streams from encrypted steams.
5.4.4 Auto Correlation Test
This test is used to check for randomness in a given stream of data by calculating 
dependencies/correlations for the data values at various time lags. The auto correlation [16]
can be calculated by the equations (6)-(8) given in the previous chapter. For a highly random 
data stream the auto correlation of the data at any time lag is expected to be quite close to 0. 
This means that the data stream has quite few or no dependencies present, in other words if 
any part of the data stream is known it is almost impossible to determine the rest of the 
stream just by looking at the previous values. Auto correlation values for a data stream 
having much low randomness would be appreciably higher than 0.
The auto correlation test was implemented to differentiate between encrypted and 
unencrypted streams by checking for randomness in the data. The null hypothesis was that 
‘an encrypted ASCII stream is highly random and the probability of occurrence of each data 
value is approximately equal to 1/256’. The equations (6)-(8) were used to calculate the auto 
correlation values for low, high and encrypted data streams. The time lags used to test the 
hypothesis are shown in the table (e) below. The time lags considered are in powers of 2, this 
is because the frequency distribution of compressed streams at powers of 2 was observed to 
33
be quite low and we hoped that by checking for correlations in the data streams at these lags 
could show a characteristic pattern which may help in differentiating high entropy and 
encrypted streams.
The observations in the table (e) below are the average auto-correlation values across 
60 file streams from each of the three entropy categories, each broken in to 32Kbyte data 
blocks. The observations show that the auto-correlation values for encrypted streams are 
quite close to 0, thus satisfying the randomness criteria. The low entropy streams on the other 
hand have a large deviation in their auto-correlation values from 0, thus showing their non-
random nature. The high entropy streams also satisfy the randomness criteria to an extent as 
the deviation from 0 is not large enough to reject the hypothesis. This test therefore also fails 
in differentiating between high entropy and encrypted streams. 
Average Auto-correlation values across 60 streams
Time Lags Low Entropy High Entropy Encrypted
1 0.3250 0.01200 0.00459
2 0.3117 0.01268 0.00462
4 0.3505 0.01034 0.00450
8 0.3263 0.00848 0.00467
16 0.2957 0.00720 0.00460
32 0.2744 0.00645 0.004627
64 0.2536 0.00589 0.00458
128 0.2397 0.00540 0.00464
Table (e)
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5.5 Initial Observations and Conclusions
The tests described above do well in differentiating between low entropy 
streams and encrypted streams. As can be seen from the observations above, both the ‘KS’ 
test and the ‘Auto-correlation’ test offers solutions to clearly differentiate between encrypted 
and low entropy streams, but fail to differentiate encrypted streams from high entropy 
streams. The high entropy streams considered are compressed streams having much low 
redundancy and high entropy. The frequency analysis of compressed streams shows a
distinctive behavior at powers of 2. This may be because of the implementation of the
compression algorithms. None of the tests described above were able to make use of the 
characteristic nature of high entropy compressed data streams. The next section describes 
tests which when implemented made differentiating high entropy streams from encrypted 
streams easier and gave low false negative and positive rates. The section also describes 
statistical tests to quickly differentiate low entropy streams from encrypted streams for an 
online implementation and with quite less overhead.
5.6 The Final Tests
Differentiating between encrypted and unencrypted data was done by a set of 
statistical tests which tested the data corpus for high entropy and randomness. Whenever the 
tested data showed signs of low randomness, or dependency on the previous data stream, the 
hypothesis that ‘the test data is encrypted’ was rejected. The test data consisted of files of 
various common formats like DOC, JPEG, TXT, and PDF. A description of the test corpus 
has been given the previous section. The tests were applied to the test corpus and depending 
on the false positive and negative rates, were either tweaked and improved upon or provided 
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some information previously not known, to be used for later tests. An effort was made to 
implement the tests so that they could work online with real time network traffic and still 
achieving acceptable false positive and negative rates.
5.6.1 The Filtering Process
The first step in detecting encrypted streams is to determine whether or not the data 
stream is a low entropy plain text. To determine this, the ‘Information Entropy’ of the data
was calculated. The Information entropy of the outgoing traffic stream is calculated using the 
Shannon’s entropy equation (2) as given below:
∑
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P(x) is the probability of occurrence of the ith character in the data stream.
The frequency of occurrence of each ASCII character in the stream is calculated, and 
this value is divided by the total length of the stream to calculate the probability of each of 
the 256 possible ASCII characters present in the stream. The logarithm can be calculated in 
real time quickly using a lookup table having all the possible log values. An entropy value 
closer to 8bits/character indicates a high entropy stream or a highly random stream of data 
which is a characteristic of encrypted data whereas values appreciably less than 
8bits/character indicates low entropy content.
Another simple method to differentiate high entropy streams from low entropy 
streams is the calculation of arithmetic mean (µ). The mean is calculated by simply adding 
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the byte values of each character in the stream as it is encountered and then dividing the sum 
by total number of characters encountered in the stream. A uniformly random data stream 
would have a mean value of “127.5” which means that there’s a uniform distribution of 
characters in the stream and thus every character has an equal probability of occurrence. A 
low entropy data stream would have a mean value which would show a high deviation from 
the expected mean value of “127.5”.
Figure 10:  ROC plot of Arithmetic Test versus Entropy Test
Shown above in Figure 10 is a ROC curve, which plots False Positives against False 
Negatives for the two methods, described above to differentiate low entropy streams from 
high entropy streams. We consider encrypted and unencrypted files in various formats such 
as Docs, Jpegs, Pdf, and Txt. The points on the plot indicate different block sizes ranging 
from 256bytes to 8192bytes. A total of 100 encrypted and unencrypted files of different sizes 
were used to generate the plot above.
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A deviation of 0.5 or less from the expected mean of 127.5 was considered as 
acceptable for an encrypted data stream. If µ<127 or µ>128 for an encrypted stream, it was 
considered to be a false negative and if 127 < µ < 128 for an unencrypted stream it’s a false 
positive. For the entropy test, the threshold was kept at 7.95, therefore any encrypted data 
stream with entropy value less than 7.95 was considered a false negative and a false positive 
was when a compressed stream had entropy more than 7.95. The ROC curve indicates that 
there’s a high false negative rate for both arithmetic and entropy tests at smaller block sizes 
ranging from 256 bytes to 8192 bytes. For a 4KB block the False Negative rate decreases 
drastically to .98% for entropy test. On the other hand the false positive rate increases as the 
block sizes increase for both the methods but the increase is more at higher block sizes for 
the entropy test as compared to the arithmetic test. The best results with fewest false positives 
and negatives occur at block sizes 4KB and 5KB for the entropy test.
5.6.2   Index of Coincidence
       If the data stream is unable to be categorized as a low entropy stream, there’s a 
high possibility that the stream may be compressed or is a highly random file stream such as 
JPEG, PDF which have a compressed format. We now require methods to differentiate such 
data streams from encrypted streams. 
The next step in determining the presence of encrypted streams is calculating the 
Index of Coincidence (IOC) [19] of the data stream which exhibits a high entropy behavior in 
the above step. The Index of Coincidence is a statistical measure of redundancy in a stream 
and even unencrypted high entropy streams such as compressed and other compressed file 
formats show a distinctive behavior. The IOC value [19] of a uniform distribution is very 
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close to 1, which means that the data stream is independent and has very little or no 
redundancy present. 
The IOC values were computed for high entropy files (encrypted and compressed) for 
a block size of 1024bytes. The IOC values were calculated using the IOC equation (16) 
below.
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N: The length of the text,
ni: The frequency of the character i in the text,
C: The number of letters in the alphabet.
The values were plotted for an encrypted document (DOC) file having approximately 
1800 blocks. The figure (11) below shows an IOC plot of an encrypted and a compressed 
file, the Y axis represents the IOC values. The plot shows a randomly distributed stream as 
the IOC values are much close to 1. The plot in figure (11) also shows the same file
compressed and the IOC values show a large deviation from 1, thus showing that the 
compressed stream is not independent and has some redundancy present. The peaks in the 
compressed plot in figure (11) indicate areas of low entropy and high redundancy. The peaks 
occur frequently throughout the stream which shows that the compressed stream has certain 
dependencies which occur after some amount of data has been processed; we suspect this is 
due to the nature of the compression algorithm.
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Figure 11: IOC plots of Compressed and Encrypted Streams
Figure 12: Cumulative Probability Plot of Distance between IOC peaks
The distance between the peaks thus provides an estimation of the minimum number 
of data blocks required to differentiate between high entropy encrypted and compressed 
streams.
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The figure (12) above shows a cumulative probability distribution of the distance 
between the IOC peaks across all the compressed files. The threshold for a peak was 
calculated by the below equation.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????  (17)
Here µ is the mean IOC value of the high entropy data stream which appears quite 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
was calculated to be approximately 1.062. The peaks are determined by finding the IOC 
values which are greater than the threshold “T” and have a higher value than all the other 
surrounding peaks within a window of size ‘S’. The figure (12) above shows that around 
90% of the peaks occur within a distance of 75-80 blocks of data or less. In other words for a 
90% confidence level to detect compressed stream one needs to collect around 75KB of the 
stream.
5.6.3 Differentiating high entropy content 
After calculating the IOC values and determining the approximate block distance 
between the peaks from the IOC plots, we estimate the number of data blocks needed to 
differentiate between high entropy content and encrypted stream with a high confidence 
level.   
The final step in differentiating encrypted streams from compressed streams is to 
implement a method which would look at the deviation of the high entropy compressed data 
stream from the expected encrypted data stream. We implement the Incremental Chi-Square 
test to differentiate the high entropy stream from encrypted stream, wherein we buffer 70-80 
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KB of data to carry out the Chi-Square test. Chi-Square test is one of the most commonly 
used tests to check for randomness in a data stream. The test calculates the degree to which 
the two given samples of data differ from each other therefore it’s used to test whether a set 
of data follows a particular distribution.
The Chi-Square test also tells the degree of confidence in rejecting or accepting a 
hypothesis. The null hypothesis that we make is that ‘the data stream is encrypted and thus 
highly random and has a uniform distribution of characters’.
We expect the probability of occurrence of each ASCII character in an encrypted data 
stream to be 1/256 as each character is equally probable to occur. The equation used to 
calculate the Chi-Square is as follows:
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k: The no. of bins
Oi :The observed frequency for the bin i
Ei: The expected frequency for the bin i.
To classify the data stream 32 bins were considered i.e. 31 degrees of freedom, with 
each bin having the frequency counts of 8 characters. The expected frequency Ei is equal to 
1/256 * 8 * (The total length of the block). This is the frequency one would expect if the data 
stream was encrypted as the probability of occurrence of each character is equal. The 
frequency of each character in a block is determined and the above Chi-Square equation is 
used to calculate the chi-square value of the entire block. This value is stored and the next 
block of the data stream is appended to the current block and the chi-square value is 
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calculated again as above. This procedure continues until sufficient no. of blocks are 
appended which is determined by the distance between the IOC peaks in the previous step.
Figure 13 Figure 14
Figure 15 Figure 16
The chi-square values obtained for the data blocks are then compared with the value 
in the chi-square probability table for a confidence level. The confidence level we choose is
‘0.90’ which means that the probability that the observed chi-square value is higher than the 
tabulated value is 10% or less. Thus if more than 1 Chi-Square value observed in 10 values is 
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more than the value in the chi-square distribution table, there is a high probability that the 
data stream is not encrypted and the stream is considered to be compressed.  
The average no. of blocks of data required to differentiate high entropy compressed 
stream from encrypted streams for different file formats is shown in the above Figures 13 -
16. The no. of blocks in the above figures is calculated by taking the mean of the distances 
between the IOC peaks. The mean distance gives an idea about the no. of blocks that would 
be required on an average to detect the different file streams. 
The above Figure 13 shows that around 30 blocks or 30KB of data is required to 
make a distinction between encrypted files and compressed PDF files. The confidence level 
at 30KB is 90%, which means that 1 out of 10 files could be classified incorrectly as 
encrypted and therefore blocked from leaving the company's gateway. We don't think this to 
be too intrusive as we consider a strong security policy which disallows any confidential data 
to leave a company unauthorized, and therefore consider the false positives acceptable. 
Similarly the Figures 14 - 16 above show that it takes around 30, 35 and 20 blocks to detect 
DOC, JPEG and TXT respectively 90% of the time. This is because the PDF and JPEG 
formats are highly compressed and thus the data stream has high entropy. The more entropy, 
the more the data is required to differentiate it from the encrypted stream. The above plots 
show that as the number of blocks increases, it gets easier to differentiate between 
compressed and encrypted streams and at relatively higher block sizes it’s possible to achieve 
a confidence level close to 100%. This is because if the dataset is large, there is more 
probability of dependencies within the data and a possibility of higher redundancy as some of 
the data may not be compressed as efficiently as it would when the dataset is small. The data
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stream therefore shows characteristics rather similar to a low entropy stream, and these 
patterns become more apparent when more data blocks are considered.
5.7 Final Observations
For low entropy streams in our corpus 98.7% of the streams will be filtered out in the 
first stage itself. Only 1.3% low entropy streams go through the next step. The Figures 13 –
16 indicate that 90% of the compressed blocks of any file format can be differentiated within 
20-30 blocks. This is a worst case scenario when we consider high entropy compressed 
streams but for low entropy streams only a few blocks would be required to reject the 
hypothesis. So for low entropy streams the false positive rate is negligible and approximately 
equal to zero.   
High entropy and encrypted streams satisfy both the arithmetic and entropy tests all 
the times. Encrypted streams do not show any distinctive behavior for the IOC test and shows 
much less deviation from the expected, the false negative rate is negligible for these streams. 
High entropy compressed streams on the other hand show a distinctive profile which can be 
used to distinguish them. The IOC test gives a maximum number of blocks required to detect 
high entropy data streams. The more the data blocks considered, higher is the probability of 
differentiating high entropy streams from encrypted streams. We consider 90% confidence 
level as an acceptable level for differentiation since this does not lead to a high false positive 
and at the same time keeps the number of data streams low. For any practical online
implementation of these methods for differentiating high entropy streams a lower than 5% 
false positive rate is quite difficult to achieve but a 10% rate is optimum for a fast 
implementation.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
Egress filtering has become an essential component of any organization’s information 
security. Most of the egress filtering tools only look at the contents of the data packets 
leaving a network but fail to perform if the data is encrypted. We have presented statistical 
techniques to differentiate encrypted data from all the other data streams flowing across a 
gateway. We show that encrypted data satisfies all of the statistical tests quickly whereas 
other data formats except compressed show a large deviation from the expected random 
distribution and hence are rejected at varying data lengths. Compressed streams mostly 
satisfy randomness tests but have a distinctive IOC profile which is used to determine the 
amount of data stream required to reject the null hypothesis that the stream is encrypted. We 
use Shannon’s information entropy equation to differentiate between the encrypted and other 
low entropy streams. To differentiate between high entropy streams such as encrypted and 
compressed we employ an incremental chi-square approach where the no. of blocks are 
determined by the average distance between the peaks in the IOC profile.
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CHAPTER 7. FUTURE WORK
This research is an attempt to propose methods and techniques to detect encrypted 
documents leaving an organization’s networks. We believe that differentiating  encrypted 
traffic flows from compressed can be done by considering lesser number of data blocks and 
still achieving the same or lower false positive and negative rates. We think that it’s also 
possible to determine the compressed and encrypted file formats by measuring the entropy of 
the data stream. Similarly the encryption and compression algorithms may be determined as 
well.
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